UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Filed September 18, 1998

CASE NUMBER 1:98CV01744
JUDGE: Royce C. Lamberth

United States of America Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
325 7^th Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20530,

Plaintiff,

General Electric Company
3135 Easton Turnpike
Fairfield, Connecticut 06431,

and

InnoServ Technologies, Inc.
320 Westway, Suite 530
Arlington, Texas 76018,

Defendants.

PUBLIC COMMENT OF
INDEPENDENT SERVICE NETWORK INTERNATIONAL
PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. §16(b),(d)

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §16(b),(d), of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalty Acts ("APPA") Independent Service Network International ("ISNI"), a trade association of 157 maintainers of high technology equipment, including medical equipment of the type at issue in this matter (See Endnote 1), submits this public comment to the Competitive Impact Statement ("CIS") published in the Federal Register at 63 FR 39894.

I. INTRODUCTION

The CIS does not comply with the APPA because it does not provide the Court or the public with sufficient information to evaluate this consent decree. Information necessary for that evaluation includes the following:

A technical and economic evaluation of the key component of this settlement — InnoServ's PREVU advanced diagnostic package ("PREVU") — to demonstrate that it can accomplish what the parties call "the essence" of this final judgment,i.e., "...to establish a viable competitor in the sale of service for certain models of G.E. diagnostic imaging equipment ..." 63 FR at 39894.
To define and describe the markets in which this "essence" of the consent decree is to be accomplished.
To provide information on other companies, if any, that expressed an interest in purchasing InnoServ and that would present less competitive problems than General Electric Medical Systems ("GEMS") as an acquirer.
To describe and provide, pursuant to APPA §§ (b) and (c), materials and documents which the United States considered determinative in formulating the consent decree so that there can be meaningful public comment (the assertion in the CIS that there are no such materials or documents is, as a District Court stated in a similar case, "incredible," U.S. v. Central Contracting Co., Inc., 537 F.Supp. 571, 576 (1982)).
The relationship, if any, between this settlement and United States v. General Electric Co., No. CV-96-121-M-CCL (D.Mont. filed August 1, 1996) ("Montana Case"), which GEMS stated it settled in order "to obtain clearance to complete the Innoserv acquisition..." See, Betzner Decl., Exhibit A

Without the above information, it is not possible for the Court to make its public interest determination pursuant to §(e) of the APPA nor is it possible for the public to make meaningful comments on the CIS.

A public interest determination is particularly important in this case because it involves the cost of healthcare, a subject important to all Americans; because GEMS has a high market share in the relevant markets, which it has extended through recent aggressive transactions unopposed by the Government; and because there is no evidence that there is any legitimate reason for GEMS to acquire one of its few competitors, a company less than 1% its size. Therefore, pursuant to APPA §(f) and based on the showing detailed below, ISNI respectfully requests that the Court authorize ISNI to intervene as a party pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the Court appoint a special master to preside over the gathering of the information necessary to evaluate this CIS.

II. ISNI AND ITS INTEREST IN THIS PROCEEDING

ISNI, an association of 157 independent service organizations, i.e., organizations servicing equipment manufactured by others (see Betzner Decl., Exhibit B for a list of members), is a non-profit corporation incorporated in the District of Columbia. In competition with the service organizations of manufacturers, the members of ISNI service various types of high-technology equipment, including medical equipment of the type that is the subject of the CIS. ISNI's members account for over $1.5 billion in commerce.

The purpose of ISNI for the past fourteen years has been to promote and maintain a closer union and organization of independent service organizations. Specifically, ISNI develops educational methods to increase awareness about independent service organizations and studies economic and legal problems confronting them. ISNI also serves as a clearing house for information and data relating to its members' businesses and ISNI promotes better relations among providers, distributors and manufacturers of supplies and services.

ISNI has participated in various legal proceedings on behalf of its members. For example, ISNI, then known as Computer Service Network International, filed a friend-of-the-court brief which was cited by the United States Supreme Court in its landmark antitrust decision concerning service aftermarkets, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et al., 504 U.S. 451, 462 n.6 (1992). Also, pursuant to the order of Chief Judge Thomas P. Griesa of the Southern District of New York (Betzner Decl., Exhibit C), ISNI has been granted the right to intervene for purposes of appeal in the proceeding concerning the termination of the IBM consent decree, United States of America v. International Business Machines Corporation, 52 CIV. 72-344 (TPG), currently pending the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. ISNI has filed a brief in that proceeding.

In his order, Judge Griesa found that "ISNI has a legitimate interest in appealing from the May ruling, and it is in the public interest to allow ISNI to appeal" (Id. at 2). Similarly, it is in the public interest for ISNI to intervene in this proceeding because a dwindling number of its members compete with GEMS in the markets alleged by the Justice Department in the complaint in this matter. The reasons that the number is dwindling are that GEMS has a large market share; it has aggressively extended that market share through the transactions described below, unopposed by the U.S. government; and its advanced diagnostics are an essential facility necessary to compete in the relevant markets.

The reasons that it is in the public interest for ISNI to intervene in this matter are cogently set forth in the Government's complaint in this matter (Betzner Decl., Exhibit J):

Paragraph 3: "If G.E. acquires InnoServ, G.E. will increase its already high share in the markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment on a discrete basis, particularly several models of CT scanners and MRI's , and it will eliminate an effective competitor in these markets. It will also substantially reduce competition in multi-vendor service markets. Unless blocked, this acquisition likely will result in higher prices for imaging equipment, maintenance and service."

Paragraph 20: "In many of these markets, InnoServ is one of the few ISOs that has specialized in servicing G.E. imaging equipment ... the competition between G.E. and InnoServ in these markets has resulted in significant price reductions for consumers. G.E.'s acquisition of InnoServ would eliminate this competition and increase G.E.'s already high share in the markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment, particularly several models of CT scanners and MRIs. It would also substantially reduce competition in multi-vendor service markets."

Paragraph 21: "Successfully entry into the relative markets is difficult, time-consuming and costly. In general, customers prefer to purchase service from existing, reputable firms in the industry. Therefore, new entrants often find it difficult to enter on a scale necessary to succeed financially."

Paragraph 23: "G.E.'s proposed acquisition of InnoServ is likely to lessen competition substantially and tend to create a monopoly in interstate trading commerce in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18."

Paragraph 24: "The transaction likely will have the following effects among others:

Actual and future competition between G.E. and InnoServ will be eliminated in the markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment under discrete, machine-by-machine basis in numerous local markets throughout the United States.
Competition generally in the markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment on a discrete, machine-by-machine basis in numerous local markets throughout the United States will be lessened substantially;
Actual and future competition between G.E. and InnoServ will be eliminated in the markets for multi-vendor service in numerous local markets throughout the United States; and
Competition generally in the markets for multi-vendor service in numerous local markets throughout the United States will be lessened substantially."

Despite these pernicious effects, the government has consented to this acquisition based essentially on the divestiture of PREVU. However, the parties have not provided this Court or the public with the fundamental information necessary to evaluate this settlement. ISNI, because of the expertise of its members and counsel, can aid the Court in obtaining and evaluating this information; ISNI respectfully requests that the Court grant ISNI the opportunity to do so pursuant to APPA §(f).

III. GEMS' MONOPOLY AND ITS SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AND EXTEND IT

According to its own press release, "G.E. Medical Systems, based in Milwaukee, WIS., is a $4.5 billion global provider of medical diagnostic imaging systems, services and solutions with 16,000 employees worldwide." (Betzner Decl., Exhibit A.) As indicated by the quotations from the Government's complaint in Section II above, GEMS has a monopoly market share in the markets alleged by the government in its complaint: 1) servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment on a discrete machine-by-machine basis in numerous local markets throughout the United States, and 2) multi-vendor service in numerous local markets throughout the United States.

What is more alarming is that G.E. has extended and maintained this monopolistic market share by a number of aggressive transactions in recent years unopposed by the U.S. government:

August, 1994: strategic alliance with Advanced NMR Systems, Inc. regarding very high field magnetic resonance systems. (Betzner Decl., Exhibit D.)

June, 1995: five-year agreement with Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. covering the service of all diagnostic imaging equipment in the hospital chain, which at that time consisted of 320 hospitals. (Id., Exhibit E.)
February, 1996: acquisition of National Medical Diagnostics, Inc., which at the time of acquisition provided medical equipment maintenance services to 220 hospitals in 23 states. (Id., Exhibit F.)
August, 1996: acquisition of Specialty Underwriters, a seller of maintenance insurance to the healthcare industry, and Maintenance Management, which provides service for medical equipment. (Id., Exhibit G.)
August, 1997: investment of $5.1 million in Advanced NMR Systems, Inc., an extension of the August 1994 alliance described above. (Id., Exhibit H.)
December, 1997: five-year marketing pact with INPHACT, a provider of on-line radiology services for radiologists. (Id., Exhibit I.)
August, 1998: acquired Serviscope, a medical equipment maintenance and asset management company that was one of the few potential candidates to compete with GEMS to acquire Innoserv. (Id. at para 6.)

With each of these transactions, GEMS got stronger both absolutely and also relative to its much smaller ISO competitors. Innoserv, with revenues of $37 million a year, is described in the CIS as "....one of the nation's largest independent service organizations ('ISOs')," 63 FR at 39898. That a $37 million a year company was considered one of the largest competitors of a company 120 times its size in itself illustrates the weakness of GEMS' competitors.

Nonetheless, an ISO like Innoserv does provide customers with an alternative. This alternative keeps GEMS from having a 100% monopoly and also helps to keep prices down to a certain extent.

Eliminating that little spark of competition was the only logical motivation for GEMS to acquire Innoserv. This acquisition makes no sense except to eliminate one of the last vestiges of national competition for the service of GEMS imaging equipment. The fact that GEMS has since acquired one of the other remaining competitors — Serviscope — demonstrates that GEMS' goal is the lack of any meaningful service competition.

IV. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPA

§(b)(3) of the APPA requires the CIS to recite "an explanation of the proposal for a consent judgment, including an explanation of ... relief to be obtained thereby, and the anticipated effects on competition of such relief," and §(e) requires this Court to determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest by considering "the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment." As demonstrated below, the information required by §(b) has not been provided in the Competitive Impact Statement, and that fact disables the ISNI and other members of the public from making a "meaningful public comment" on it (APPA §(c)) and disables this Court from making its public interest determination pursuant to APPA §(e).

The following fundamental information is missing from the CIS: a technical and economic assessment of PREVU; a description of the markets involved in the settlement and the effect of the settlement on those markets; information about other firms, if any, that expressed interest in purchasing InnoServ; and information about the relationship of the simultaneous consent decree between the same two parties concerning a litigation in Montana that also involved GEMS' advanced diagnostics. The significance of the non-provision of these items of information will be discussed below.

A. The CIS Provides Nothing But Speculation About the Acknowledged Keystone of This Consent Decree, PREVU.

The proposed stipulated final judgment of this litigation states that "the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and certain divestiture through sale or licensing of certain rights or assets by the defendants to establish a viable competitor in the sale of service for certain models of G.E. diagnostic imaging equipment, and the sale of comprehensive asset-management or multi-vendor services, or in the licensing of advanced diagnostic software for use in any such service." 63 FR at 39894 (emphasis added). These "rights or assets" are PREVU, which is defined at 63 FR 39895.

But the CIS does not make a showing — or even try to make a showing — that PREVUcan establish a viable competitor. One of the few things that the CIS says about PREVU is the conclusory statement that PREVU gives "...InnoServ a competitive advantage in servicing certain models of imaging equipment and in multi-vendor service." Id. at 39898, and that "InnoServ is an effective competitor of G.E. in part because InnoServ is one of the very few companies that has developed proprietary diagnostic software for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment." (Id. at 39898). But this information about so-called effective competition is contradicted by other information in the CIS:

[InnoServ] has struggled financially for the past two years ... losing over $1.5 million for the nine months ending January 31, 1998. In March 1998, InnoServ publicly expressed concern about its ability to continue to meet its working capital requirements.

This fact alone indicates that InnoServ is not providing effective competition to GEMS and that PREVU is not helping it to do so. It makes a significant difference in the antitrust analysis whether Innoserv is an effective or a struggling competitor. If it is effective, why is it losing money? If it is struggling, how will the divestiture of PREVU create an effective competitor when it was not able to make Innoserv an effective competitor? The contradictory statements on this subject in the CIS disable public commentators and the court from making this critical analysis.

The only other information about PREVU in the Competitive Impact Statement is as conclusory as that presented above: "The divestiture of the PREVU diagnostic package will allow one or more third parties to use the software, which in turn will enable them to service more efficiently certain models of imaging equipment and better compete in the markets for servicing individual pieces of imaging equipment and providing multi-vendor service." Id. at 39899. There is absolutely no evidence supporting these conclusions. The reader of the CIS does not know whether any entity has ever asked to license or purchase PREVU. Similarly, the reader of the CIS cannot know if or, if so, why, use of PREVU will enable these unnamed "third parties" "... to service more efficiently certain models of imaging equipment.." Id.

The CIS goes on to say, in a completely speculative manner, that "in addition to using the package in its service business, a buyer of PREVU could resell or license PREVU to other parties." Id. Again, the reader of the CIS does not know the names of any potential "other parties" to whom the unnamed "third parties" buying PREVU could resell or license PREVU.

The CIS adds, "The ability to improve upon PREVU ... would further improve an entity's ability to compete with G.E." Id. Without having told the reader of the CIS in any detail what PREVU is, it is impossible to know whether it will improve anyone's ability to compete with GEMS or, a fortiori, "further improve" such ability.

At a minimum, the following information is needed for the public and the Court to evaluate this consent decree:

A detailed description of PREVU;
Whether anyone has licensed or purchased PREVU from InnoServ;
Whether anyone has expressed an interest to license or purchase PREVU from InnoServ;
Whether PREVU helps InnoServ and potentially others to compete with GEMS and, if so, how;
A comparison between the effectiveness of PREVU and the effectiveness of GEMS' advanced diagnostics;
Why it is not anticompetitive for GEMS to retain a non-exclusive non-assignable license to use PREVU (Id. at 39895) even though GEMS does not, and is not being required to, license its own advanced diagnostic software to competing service providers.

The CIS itself indicates doubt as to the value of PREVU by providing for the appointment of a trustee to sell PREVU if it is not sold within approximately 180 days. Advanced diagnostics allegedly capable of creating a viable competitor would not be on the market that long.

B. The CIS Does Not Provide Adequate Information About the Markets Involved and the Effect of the Consent Decree on those Markets.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that anticompetitive restraints have to be considered "in light of the competitive situation in 'the product market as a whole'", Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 45 (1977), and that "an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks." Id, at 53, n. 21. At a minimum, such an analysis requires a definition of the relevant markets; the structure of such markets, including such factors as the number of firms and their respective market shares; and an analysis of the effect of the restraint and of the consent decree on price, output, consumer choice, and product quality. As detailed below, none of this information appears in any useful way in the CIS.

The Government alleges the following markets in its Complaint (Betzner Decl., Exhibit J):

The markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment on a discrete machine-by-machine basis in numerous local markets throughout the United States; and
the markets for multi-vendor service in numerous local markets throughout the United States.

See Complaint at Paragraphs 2, 3, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 24. However, nowhere have these markets been defined in the CIS.

Similarly, the complaint is bereft of information about market structure, in particular the number of firms in the alleged markets with their respective market shares. Indeed, no competitors in these markets are named except InnoServ and GEMS. and no market shares are given.

Without market definitions and without a description of the structure of the market, it is impossible to describe the anticipated effects on competition of the consent decree as required by APPA §(b)(3). Without such information, the following assertion in the CIS is purely conclusory with no evidence at all backing it up: "The proposed Final Judgment would promote additional competition in servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment and in multi-vendor service by requiring G.E. to divest InnoServ's proprietary diagnostic service software and related materials to an acquirer acceptable to the United States." 63 FR at 39898. The combination of the total lack of market information with the total lack of substantive information about PREVU stymies public commenters like ISNI from providing meaningful comment and disables this Court completely from making the public interest determination required by APPA §e.

C. The CIS Does Not Provide Information About Other Companies Interested in Purchasing Innoserv

Given 1) the power, alleged in the Complaint, of GEMS to affect the market, 2) GEMS' size, 3) GEMS' recent transactions increasing that size and power (see Section II above), and 4) the low price of Innoserv ($16 million — see 63 FR at 39898) relative to GEMS' size, it is not surprising that GEMS has made the first offer for Innoserv. What the CIS does not state, however, is 1) what other companies, if any, expressed interest in Innoserv; 2) whether there was, as is likely, some appraisal done by a third party like an investment bank of the worth of Innoserv and/or PREVU, or 3) how long Innoserv was on the market. This information is essential for the court to make its public interest determination because, given the facts listed at the beginning of this paragraph, there may have been a serious suitor of Innoserv that would have had a much less anticompetitive effect than GEMS but that could not compete in a bidding war with GEMS. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an acquiring company with more of an anti-competitive effect than GEMS.

D. The CIS Does Not Provide Adequate Information On The Related Montana Consent Decree

According to the CIS, "In conjunction with this settlement, GE has also agreed to consent to all of the relief that the government was seeking in another case, United States v. General Electric Company, No. CV-96-121-M-CCL (D.Mont. filed Aug. 1, 1996), " 63 FR at 39899. GEMS states this fact more emphatically in its press release about the Innoserv consent decree:

To obtain clearance to complete the Innoserv acquisition, G.E. Medical Systems agreed to settle a civil lawsuit filed in Montana by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. That lawsuit was filed in 1996 and challenged a G.E. Medical Systems practice under which health-care providers who were also in the business of performing third-party medical equipment service were not eligible to license G.E.'s proprietary advanced service materials," Betzner Decl., Exhibit A, emphasis added.

Even though the Montana consent decree involves GEMS' advanced diagnostics, the CIS gives no supporting evidence or explanation of the following assertions at CIS 39899: "The United States evaluated the merits of the settlement proposals in each case independently, concluding that the proposed settlement of this case is in the public interest for the reasons stated herein, and that the proposed settlement of the Montana case is in the public interest for reasons stated in the Competitive Impact Statement filed in that case today."

This dearth of evidence or explanation is problematic for public commenters like ISNI and for the Court because of the following assertion in the Montana CIS, 63 FR 40737, 40738: "GE has developed advanced service materials [diagnostics like PREVU] that enable service engineers to service certain GE imaging equipment much more quickly than otherwise possible." "Otherwise possible," of course, includes servicing with PREVU. Because of that fact the "essence" of the Innoserv Final Judgment, i.e., "to establish a viable competitor" to GEMS service, 63 FR 39894, does not appear to be possible because, by the U.S. Government's own cryptic evaluation, PREVU is inferior to the advanced service materials of GEMS.

The only way to accomplish this "essence" appears to be to require the licensing of GEMS' advanced diagnostics to competitors. Mandatory licensing of the intellectual property of a monopolist was used as a remedy in the Kodak case (Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1226, 1227 (9^th Cir. 1997)) after a jury verdict. Such a remedy is a fortiori, appropriate here where GEMS seeks to extend its monopoly by a Government-approved and Court-approved acquisition.

The Government appears to have the remedy backwards in this case: it appears that the divestiture of PREVU will accomplish nothing whereas the mandatory licensing of GEMS advanced diagnostics could establish a viable competitor, which is the alleged "essence" of this consent decree.

E. The CIS Asserts, Incredibly, That There Were NO Materials Which the United States Considered Determinative in Formulating the Consent Decree

APPA §(b) requires the United States to publish with the CIS "...any other materials and documents which the United States considered determinative in formulating such proposal..." The CIS at 39900 states, incredibly, that "there are not determinative materials or documents within the meaning of the APPA that were considered by the plaintiff in formulating the proposed Final Judgment."

This Court can take judicial notice that antitrust cases are among the most complex, document-intensive cases in the Federal Courts. This Court should respond in the same way as another District Court Judge responded to the same incredible claim: with incredulity and with an order to produce documents required by law. U.S. v. Central Contracting Co., Inc., 537 F.Supp. 571, 575, 577 (E.D.Va. 1982):

The Act [APPA] clearly does not require a full airing of Justice Department files, but the Court cannot countenance plaintiff's claim that though Congress enacted sunshine legislation the courts may blandly (and blindly) accept government certification in case after case that no documents or materials, by themselves or in the aggregate, led to a determination by the government that it should enter into a consent decree...

* * *

This does not require full disclosure of Justice Department files ... or defendant's files, but it does require a good faith review of all pertinent documents and materials and a disclosure of those which meet the above [APPA] criterium.

Although no entity but the Government can know what these documents are, they should include at least the following:

— those documents providing the good-faith basis for the Government to file its complaint;

— third-party analyses or evaluations of Innoserv and/or PREVU;

— documents relating to the efforts of others, if any, to acquire Innoserv;

— documents supporting the conclusory statements in the CIS about how the divestiture of PREVU will increase competition; and,

— documents comparing PREVU and the advanced service materials of GEMS litigated in the Montana case.

These documents or documents like them must exist or else there is no reasoned basis for the consent decree. If they do not exist, then the Antitrust Division is not acting in a professional, competent manner.

V. THIS COURT SHOULD AUTHORIZE ISNI TO INTERVENE AND SHOULD APPOINT A SPECIAL MASTER

APPA §(f) authorizes this Court to "appoint a special master and such outside consultants or expert witnesses as the court may deem appropriate" and to "authorize full or limited participation in proceeding before the court by interested persons or agencies, including ... intervention as a party pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure..." The defects of the CIS described above amply justify such an appointment and such an authorization.

If the Government had unfettered prosecutorial discretion to settle antitrust cases, the APPA would not exist. Yet the Government is endowing itself with such unfettered discretion by not providing in the CIS information necessary for this Court to makes its required public interest determination and for the public to meaningfully comment on the CIS.

Whatever the reason for this non-compliance with the APPA, the Court cannot permit it. Because the Government and GEMS have not complied with the law although they clearly had the knowledge and the resources to do so, it is appropriate for the Court to use the APPA provisions that permit compliance with the APPA to occur.

As mentioned in §II above, the ISNI has the interest, expertise and the experience to aid the Court and to aid a special master appointed by the Court. A special master would be an efficient use of the Court's resources because fact gathering akin to discovery will be involved. The gathering and marshalling of facts will place this matter in the position in which it should have been when the CIS was filed. At that point the Court should be in a position to makes its public interest determination or to order further proceedings.

At the very least, the Court should order a hearing before making its public interest determination and should permit the ISNI to participate in that hearing. Otherwise, the Government's response to this comment will go unanswered, and there is no reason to believe that the quality of that response will be any better than the quality of the CIS.

VI. CONCLUSION

By keeping the public and the Court ignorant of information required by the APPA, the Government is endowing itself with the unfettered prosecutorial discretion contrary to the very purpose of the APPA. ISNI respectfully requests this Court to uphold both the letter and the spirit of that statute in this important sector of the economy affecting the healthcare costs of literally every American.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: September 15, 1998

Ronald S. Katz, Esq
General Counsel, ISNI
Coudert Brothers
4 Embarcadero Center, Ste. 3300
San Francisco CA 94111
Telephone: 415- 986-1300.

Endnotes: 1 InnoServ Technologies, Inc., one of the defendants in the above-captioned case, is a member of ISNI, but, because of conflict of interest considerations, has not been informed of or consulted about this public comment. Similarly, this comment is not intended to express any views of Serviscope, an ISNI member acquired by GEMS in August, 1998.

about association board of directors sponsors contact us home
news events members only become a member benefits of membership Login
About Association Service Industry Association The concept behind the SIA Here's what we stand for The SIA Pledge	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Filed September 18, 1998 CASE NUMBER 1:98CV01744 JUDGE: Royce C. Lamberth United States of America Department of Justice Antitrust Division 325 7^th Street, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20530, Plaintiff, v. General Electric Company 3135 Easton Turnpike Fairfield, Connecticut 06431, and InnoServ Technologies, Inc. 320 Westway, Suite 530 Arlington, Texas 76018, Defendants. PUBLIC COMMENT OF INDEPENDENT SERVICE NETWORK INTERNATIONAL PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. §16(b),(d) Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §16(b),(d), of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalty Acts ("APPA") Independent Service Network International ("ISNI"), a trade association of 157 maintainers of high technology equipment, including medical equipment of the type at issue in this matter (See Endnote 1), submits this public comment to the Competitive Impact Statement ("CIS") published in the Federal Register at 63 FR 39894. I. INTRODUCTION The CIS does not comply with the APPA because it does not provide the Court or the public with sufficient information to evaluate this consent decree. Information necessary for that evaluation includes the following: A technical and economic evaluation of the key component of this settlement — InnoServ's PREVU advanced diagnostic package ("PREVU") — to demonstrate that it can accomplish what the parties call "the essence" of this final judgment,i.e., "...to establish a viable competitor in the sale of service for certain models of G.E. diagnostic imaging equipment ..." 63 FR at 39894. To define and describe the markets in which this "essence" of the consent decree is to be accomplished. To provide information on other companies, if any, that expressed an interest in purchasing InnoServ and that would present less competitive problems than General Electric Medical Systems ("GEMS") as an acquirer. To describe and provide, pursuant to APPA §§ (b) and (c), materials and documents which the United States considered determinative in formulating the consent decree so that there can be meaningful public comment (the assertion in the CIS that there are no such materials or documents is, as a District Court stated in a similar case, "incredible," U.S. v. Central Contracting Co., Inc., 537 F.Supp. 571, 576 (1982)). The relationship, if any, between this settlement and United States v. General Electric Co., No. CV-96-121-M-CCL (D.Mont. filed August 1, 1996) ("Montana Case"), which GEMS stated it settled in order "to obtain clearance to complete the Innoserv acquisition..." See, Betzner Decl., Exhibit A Without the above information, it is not possible for the Court to make its public interest determination pursuant to §(e) of the APPA nor is it possible for the public to make meaningful comments on the CIS. A public interest determination is particularly important in this case because it involves the cost of healthcare, a subject important to all Americans; because GEMS has a high market share in the relevant markets, which it has extended through recent aggressive transactions unopposed by the Government; and because there is no evidence that there is any legitimate reason for GEMS to acquire one of its few competitors, a company less than 1% its size. Therefore, pursuant to APPA §(f) and based on the showing detailed below, ISNI respectfully requests that the Court authorize ISNI to intervene as a party pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the Court appoint a special master to preside over the gathering of the information necessary to evaluate this CIS. II. ISNI AND ITS INTEREST IN THIS PROCEEDING ISNI, an association of 157 independent service organizations, i.e., organizations servicing equipment manufactured by others (see Betzner Decl., Exhibit B for a list of members), is a non-profit corporation incorporated in the District of Columbia. In competition with the service organizations of manufacturers, the members of ISNI service various types of high-technology equipment, including medical equipment of the type that is the subject of the CIS. ISNI's members account for over $1.5 billion in commerce. The purpose of ISNI for the past fourteen years has been to promote and maintain a closer union and organization of independent service organizations. Specifically, ISNI develops educational methods to increase awareness about independent service organizations and studies economic and legal problems confronting them. ISNI also serves as a clearing house for information and data relating to its members' businesses and ISNI promotes better relations among providers, distributors and manufacturers of supplies and services. ISNI has participated in various legal proceedings on behalf of its members. For example, ISNI, then known as Computer Service Network International, filed a friend-of-the-court brief which was cited by the United States Supreme Court in its landmark antitrust decision concerning service aftermarkets, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et al., 504 U.S. 451, 462 n.6 (1992). Also, pursuant to the order of Chief Judge Thomas P. Griesa of the Southern District of New York (Betzner Decl., Exhibit C), ISNI has been granted the right to intervene for purposes of appeal in the proceeding concerning the termination of the IBM consent decree, United States of America v. International Business Machines Corporation, 52 CIV. 72-344 (TPG), currently pending the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. ISNI has filed a brief in that proceeding. In his order, Judge Griesa found that "ISNI has a legitimate interest in appealing from the May ruling, and it is in the public interest to allow ISNI to appeal" (Id. at 2). Similarly, it is in the public interest for ISNI to intervene in this proceeding because a dwindling number of its members compete with GEMS in the markets alleged by the Justice Department in the complaint in this matter. The reasons that the number is dwindling are that GEMS has a large market share; it has aggressively extended that market share through the transactions described below, unopposed by the U.S. government; and its advanced diagnostics are an essential facility necessary to compete in the relevant markets. The reasons that it is in the public interest for ISNI to intervene in this matter are cogently set forth in the Government's complaint in this matter (Betzner Decl., Exhibit J): Paragraph 3: "If G.E. acquires InnoServ, G.E. will increase its already high share in the markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment on a discrete basis, particularly several models of CT scanners and MRI's , and it will eliminate an effective competitor in these markets. It will also substantially reduce competition in multi-vendor service markets. Unless blocked, this acquisition likely will result in higher prices for imaging equipment, maintenance and service." Paragraph 20: "In many of these markets, InnoServ is one of the few ISOs that has specialized in servicing G.E. imaging equipment ... the competition between G.E. and InnoServ in these markets has resulted in significant price reductions for consumers. G.E.'s acquisition of InnoServ would eliminate this competition and increase G.E.'s already high share in the markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment, particularly several models of CT scanners and MRIs. It would also substantially reduce competition in multi-vendor service markets." Paragraph 21: "Successfully entry into the relative markets is difficult, time-consuming and costly. In general, customers prefer to purchase service from existing, reputable firms in the industry. Therefore, new entrants often find it difficult to enter on a scale necessary to succeed financially." Paragraph 23: "G.E.'s proposed acquisition of InnoServ is likely to lessen competition substantially and tend to create a monopoly in interstate trading commerce in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18." Paragraph 24: "The transaction likely will have the following effects among others: Actual and future competition between G.E. and InnoServ will be eliminated in the markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment under discrete, machine-by-machine basis in numerous local markets throughout the United States. Competition generally in the markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment on a discrete, machine-by-machine basis in numerous local markets throughout the United States will be lessened substantially; Actual and future competition between G.E. and InnoServ will be eliminated in the markets for multi-vendor service in numerous local markets throughout the United States; and Competition generally in the markets for multi-vendor service in numerous local markets throughout the United States will be lessened substantially." Despite these pernicious effects, the government has consented to this acquisition based essentially on the divestiture of PREVU. However, the parties have not provided this Court or the public with the fundamental information necessary to evaluate this settlement. ISNI, because of the expertise of its members and counsel, can aid the Court in obtaining and evaluating this information; ISNI respectfully requests that the Court grant ISNI the opportunity to do so pursuant to APPA §(f). III. GEMS' MONOPOLY AND ITS SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AND EXTEND IT According to its own press release, "G.E. Medical Systems, based in Milwaukee, WIS., is a $4.5 billion global provider of medical diagnostic imaging systems, services and solutions with 16,000 employees worldwide." (Betzner Decl., Exhibit A.) As indicated by the quotations from the Government's complaint in Section II above, GEMS has a monopoly market share in the markets alleged by the government in its complaint: 1) servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment on a discrete machine-by-machine basis in numerous local markets throughout the United States, and 2) multi-vendor service in numerous local markets throughout the United States. What is more alarming is that G.E. has extended and maintained this monopolistic market share by a number of aggressive transactions in recent years unopposed by the U.S. government: August, 1994: strategic alliance with Advanced NMR Systems, Inc. regarding very high field magnetic resonance systems. (Betzner Decl., Exhibit D.) June, 1995: five-year agreement with Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. covering the service of all diagnostic imaging equipment in the hospital chain, which at that time consisted of 320 hospitals. (Id., Exhibit E.) February, 1996: acquisition of National Medical Diagnostics, Inc., which at the time of acquisition provided medical equipment maintenance services to 220 hospitals in 23 states. (Id., Exhibit F.) August, 1996: acquisition of Specialty Underwriters, a seller of maintenance insurance to the healthcare industry, and Maintenance Management, which provides service for medical equipment. (Id., Exhibit G.) August, 1997: investment of $5.1 million in Advanced NMR Systems, Inc., an extension of the August 1994 alliance described above. (Id., Exhibit H.) December, 1997: five-year marketing pact with INPHACT, a provider of on-line radiology services for radiologists. (Id., Exhibit I.) August, 1998: acquired Serviscope, a medical equipment maintenance and asset management company that was one of the few potential candidates to compete with GEMS to acquire Innoserv. (Id. at para 6.) With each of these transactions, GEMS got stronger both absolutely and also relative to its much smaller ISO competitors. Innoserv, with revenues of $37 million a year, is described in the CIS as "....one of the nation's largest independent service organizations ('ISOs')," 63 FR at 39898. That a $37 million a year company was considered one of the largest competitors of a company 120 times its size in itself illustrates the weakness of GEMS' competitors. Nonetheless, an ISO like Innoserv does provide customers with an alternative. This alternative keeps GEMS from having a 100% monopoly and also helps to keep prices down to a certain extent. Eliminating that little spark of competition was the only logical motivation for GEMS to acquire Innoserv. This acquisition makes no sense except to eliminate one of the last vestiges of national competition for the service of GEMS imaging equipment. The fact that GEMS has since acquired one of the other remaining competitors — Serviscope — demonstrates that GEMS' goal is the lack of any meaningful service competition. IV. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPA §(b)(3) of the APPA requires the CIS to recite "an explanation of the proposal for a consent judgment, including an explanation of ... relief to be obtained thereby, and the anticipated effects on competition of such relief," and §(e) requires this Court to determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest by considering "the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment." As demonstrated below, the information required by §(b) has not been provided in the Competitive Impact Statement, and that fact disables the ISNI and other members of the public from making a "meaningful public comment" on it (APPA §(c)) and disables this Court from making its public interest determination pursuant to APPA §(e). The following fundamental information is missing from the CIS: a technical and economic assessment of PREVU; a description of the markets involved in the settlement and the effect of the settlement on those markets; information about other firms, if any, that expressed interest in purchasing InnoServ; and information about the relationship of the simultaneous consent decree between the same two parties concerning a litigation in Montana that also involved GEMS' advanced diagnostics. The significance of the non-provision of these items of information will be discussed below. A. The CIS Provides Nothing But Speculation About the Acknowledged Keystone of This Consent Decree, PREVU. The proposed stipulated final judgment of this litigation states that "the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and certain divestiture through sale or licensing of certain rights or assets by the defendants to establish a viable competitor in the sale of service for certain models of G.E. diagnostic imaging equipment, and the sale of comprehensive asset-management or multi-vendor services, or in the licensing of advanced diagnostic software for use in any such service." 63 FR at 39894 (emphasis added). These "rights or assets" are PREVU, which is defined at 63 FR 39895. But the CIS does not make a showing — or even try to make a showing — that PREVUcan establish a viable competitor. One of the few things that the CIS says about PREVU is the conclusory statement that PREVU gives "...InnoServ a competitive advantage in servicing certain models of imaging equipment and in multi-vendor service." Id. at 39898, and that "InnoServ is an effective competitor of G.E. in part because InnoServ is one of the very few companies that has developed proprietary diagnostic software for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment." (Id. at 39898). But this information about so-called effective competition is contradicted by other information in the CIS: [InnoServ] has struggled financially for the past two years ... losing over $1.5 million for the nine months ending January 31, 1998. In March 1998, InnoServ publicly expressed concern about its ability to continue to meet its working capital requirements. This fact alone indicates that InnoServ is not providing effective competition to GEMS and that PREVU is not helping it to do so. It makes a significant difference in the antitrust analysis whether Innoserv is an effective or a struggling competitor. If it is effective, why is it losing money? If it is struggling, how will the divestiture of PREVU create an effective competitor when it was not able to make Innoserv an effective competitor? The contradictory statements on this subject in the CIS disable public commentators and the court from making this critical analysis. The only other information about PREVU in the Competitive Impact Statement is as conclusory as that presented above: "The divestiture of the PREVU diagnostic package will allow one or more third parties to use the software, which in turn will enable them to service more efficiently certain models of imaging equipment and better compete in the markets for servicing individual pieces of imaging equipment and providing multi-vendor service." Id. at 39899. There is absolutely no evidence supporting these conclusions. The reader of the CIS does not know whether any entity has ever asked to license or purchase PREVU. Similarly, the reader of the CIS cannot know if or, if so, why, use of PREVU will enable these unnamed "third parties" "... to service more efficiently certain models of imaging equipment.." Id. The CIS goes on to say, in a completely speculative manner, that "in addition to using the package in its service business, a buyer of PREVU could resell or license PREVU to other parties." Id. Again, the reader of the CIS does not know the names of any potential "other parties" to whom the unnamed "third parties" buying PREVU could resell or license PREVU. The CIS adds, "The ability to improve upon PREVU ... would further improve an entity's ability to compete with G.E." Id. Without having told the reader of the CIS in any detail what PREVU is, it is impossible to know whether it will improve anyone's ability to compete with GEMS or, a fortiori, "further improve" such ability. At a minimum, the following information is needed for the public and the Court to evaluate this consent decree: A detailed description of PREVU; Whether anyone has licensed or purchased PREVU from InnoServ; Whether anyone has expressed an interest to license or purchase PREVU from InnoServ; Whether PREVU helps InnoServ and potentially others to compete with GEMS and, if so, how; A comparison between the effectiveness of PREVU and the effectiveness of GEMS' advanced diagnostics; Why it is not anticompetitive for GEMS to retain a non-exclusive non-assignable license to use PREVU (Id. at 39895) even though GEMS does not, and is not being required to, license its own advanced diagnostic software to competing service providers. The CIS itself indicates doubt as to the value of PREVU by providing for the appointment of a trustee to sell PREVU if it is not sold within approximately 180 days. Advanced diagnostics allegedly capable of creating a viable competitor would not be on the market that long. B. The CIS Does Not Provide Adequate Information About the Markets Involved and the Effect of the Consent Decree on those Markets. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that anticompetitive restraints have to be considered "in light of the competitive situation in 'the product market as a whole'", Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 45 (1977), and that "an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks." Id, at 53, n. 21. At a minimum, such an analysis requires a definition of the relevant markets; the structure of such markets, including such factors as the number of firms and their respective market shares; and an analysis of the effect of the restraint and of the consent decree on price, output, consumer choice, and product quality. As detailed below, none of this information appears in any useful way in the CIS. The Government alleges the following markets in its Complaint (Betzner Decl., Exhibit J): The markets for servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment on a discrete machine-by-machine basis in numerous local markets throughout the United States; and the markets for multi-vendor service in numerous local markets throughout the United States. See Complaint at Paragraphs 2, 3, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 24. However, nowhere have these markets been defined in the CIS. Similarly, the complaint is bereft of information about market structure, in particular the number of firms in the alleged markets with their respective market shares. Indeed, no competitors in these markets are named except InnoServ and GEMS. and no market shares are given. Without market definitions and without a description of the structure of the market, it is impossible to describe the anticipated effects on competition of the consent decree as required by APPA §(b)(3). Without such information, the following assertion in the CIS is purely conclusory with no evidence at all backing it up: "The proposed Final Judgment would promote additional competition in servicing certain models of G.E. imaging equipment and in multi-vendor service by requiring G.E. to divest InnoServ's proprietary diagnostic service software and related materials to an acquirer acceptable to the United States." 63 FR at 39898. The combination of the total lack of market information with the total lack of substantive information about PREVU stymies public commenters like ISNI from providing meaningful comment and disables this Court completely from making the public interest determination required by APPA §e. C. The CIS Does Not Provide Information About Other Companies Interested in Purchasing Innoserv Given 1) the power, alleged in the Complaint, of GEMS to affect the market, 2) GEMS' size, 3) GEMS' recent transactions increasing that size and power (see Section II above), and 4) the low price of Innoserv ($16 million — see 63 FR at 39898) relative to GEMS' size, it is not surprising that GEMS has made the first offer for Innoserv. What the CIS does not state, however, is 1) what other companies, if any, expressed interest in Innoserv; 2) whether there was, as is likely, some appraisal done by a third party like an investment bank of the worth of Innoserv and/or PREVU, or 3) how long Innoserv was on the market. This information is essential for the court to make its public interest determination because, given the facts listed at the beginning of this paragraph, there may have been a serious suitor of Innoserv that would have had a much less anticompetitive effect than GEMS but that could not compete in a bidding war with GEMS. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an acquiring company with more of an anti-competitive effect than GEMS. D. The CIS Does Not Provide Adequate Information On The Related Montana Consent Decree According to the CIS, "In conjunction with this settlement, GE has also agreed to consent to all of the relief that the government was seeking in another case, United States v. General Electric Company, No. CV-96-121-M-CCL (D.Mont. filed Aug. 1, 1996), " 63 FR at 39899. GEMS states this fact more emphatically in its press release about the Innoserv consent decree: To obtain clearance to complete the Innoserv acquisition, G.E. Medical Systems agreed to settle a civil lawsuit filed in Montana by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. That lawsuit was filed in 1996 and challenged a G.E. Medical Systems practice under which health-care providers who were also in the business of performing third-party medical equipment service were not eligible to license G.E.'s proprietary advanced service materials," Betzner Decl., Exhibit A, emphasis added. Even though the Montana consent decree involves GEMS' advanced diagnostics, the CIS gives no supporting evidence or explanation of the following assertions at CIS 39899: "The United States evaluated the merits of the settlement proposals in each case independently, concluding that the proposed settlement of this case is in the public interest for the reasons stated herein, and that the proposed settlement of the Montana case is in the public interest for reasons stated in the Competitive Impact Statement filed in that case today." This dearth of evidence or explanation is problematic for public commenters like ISNI and for the Court because of the following assertion in the Montana CIS, 63 FR 40737, 40738: "GE has developed advanced service materials [diagnostics like PREVU] that enable service engineers to service certain GE imaging equipment much more quickly than otherwise possible." "Otherwise possible," of course, includes servicing with PREVU. Because of that fact the "essence" of the Innoserv Final Judgment, i.e., "to establish a viable competitor" to GEMS service, 63 FR 39894, does not appear to be possible because, by the U.S. Government's own cryptic evaluation, PREVU is inferior to the advanced service materials of GEMS. The only way to accomplish this "essence" appears to be to require the licensing of GEMS' advanced diagnostics to competitors. Mandatory licensing of the intellectual property of a monopolist was used as a remedy in the Kodak case (Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1226, 1227 (9^th Cir. 1997)) after a jury verdict. Such a remedy is a fortiori, appropriate here where GEMS seeks to extend its monopoly by a Government-approved and Court-approved acquisition. The Government appears to have the remedy backwards in this case: it appears that the divestiture of PREVU will accomplish nothing whereas the mandatory licensing of GEMS advanced diagnostics could establish a viable competitor, which is the alleged "essence" of this consent decree. E. The CIS Asserts, Incredibly, That There Were NO Materials Which the United States Considered Determinative in Formulating the Consent Decree APPA §(b) requires the United States to publish with the CIS "...any other materials and documents which the United States considered determinative in formulating such proposal..." The CIS at 39900 states, incredibly, that "there are not determinative materials or documents within the meaning of the APPA that were considered by the plaintiff in formulating the proposed Final Judgment." This Court can take judicial notice that antitrust cases are among the most complex, document-intensive cases in the Federal Courts. This Court should respond in the same way as another District Court Judge responded to the same incredible claim: with incredulity and with an order to produce documents required by law. U.S. v. Central Contracting Co., Inc., 537 F.Supp. 571, 575, 577 (E.D.Va. 1982): The Act [APPA] clearly does not require a full airing of Justice Department files, but the Court cannot countenance plaintiff's claim that though Congress enacted sunshine legislation the courts may blandly (and blindly) accept government certification in case after case that no documents or materials, by themselves or in the aggregate, led to a determination by the government that it should enter into a consent decree... * * * This does not require full disclosure of Justice Department files ... or defendant's files, but it does require a good faith review of all pertinent documents and materials and a disclosure of those which meet the above [APPA] criterium. Although no entity but the Government can know what these documents are, they should include at least the following: — those documents providing the good-faith basis for the Government to file its complaint; — third-party analyses or evaluations of Innoserv and/or PREVU; — documents relating to the efforts of others, if any, to acquire Innoserv; — documents supporting the conclusory statements in the CIS about how the divestiture of PREVU will increase competition; and, — documents comparing PREVU and the advanced service materials of GEMS litigated in the Montana case. These documents or documents like them must exist or else there is no reasoned basis for the consent decree. If they do not exist, then the Antitrust Division is not acting in a professional, competent manner. V. THIS COURT SHOULD AUTHORIZE ISNI TO INTERVENE AND SHOULD APPOINT A SPECIAL MASTER APPA §(f) authorizes this Court to "appoint a special master and such outside consultants or expert witnesses as the court may deem appropriate" and to "authorize full or limited participation in proceeding before the court by interested persons or agencies, including ... intervention as a party pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure..." The defects of the CIS described above amply justify such an appointment and such an authorization. If the Government had unfettered prosecutorial discretion to settle antitrust cases, the APPA would not exist. Yet the Government is endowing itself with such unfettered discretion by not providing in the CIS information necessary for this Court to makes its required public interest determination and for the public to meaningfully comment on the CIS. Whatever the reason for this non-compliance with the APPA, the Court cannot permit it. Because the Government and GEMS have not complied with the law although they clearly had the knowledge and the resources to do so, it is appropriate for the Court to use the APPA provisions that permit compliance with the APPA to occur. As mentioned in §II above, the ISNI has the interest, expertise and the experience to aid the Court and to aid a special master appointed by the Court. A special master would be an efficient use of the Court's resources because fact gathering akin to discovery will be involved. The gathering and marshalling of facts will place this matter in the position in which it should have been when the CIS was filed. At that point the Court should be in a position to makes its public interest determination or to order further proceedings. At the very least, the Court should order a hearing before making its public interest determination and should permit the ISNI to participate in that hearing. Otherwise, the Government's response to this comment will go unanswered, and there is no reason to believe that the quality of that response will be any better than the quality of the CIS. VI. CONCLUSION By keeping the public and the Court ignorant of information required by the APPA, the Government is endowing itself with the unfettered prosecutorial discretion contrary to the very purpose of the APPA. ISNI respectfully requests this Court to uphold both the letter and the spirit of that statute in this important sector of the economy affecting the healthcare costs of literally every American. Respectfully submitted, Dated: September 15, 1998 Ronald S. Katz, Esq General Counsel, ISNI Coudert Brothers 4 Embarcadero Center, Ste. 3300 San Francisco CA 94111 Telephone: 415- 986-1300. Endnotes: 1 InnoServ Technologies, Inc., one of the defendants in the above-captioned case, is a member of ISNI, but, because of conflict of interest considerations, has not been informed of or consulted about this public comment. Similarly, this comment is not intended to express any views of Serviscope, an ISNI member acquired by GEMS in August, 1998.
news events members only membership details benefits of membership about association board of directors sponsors Contact us: 2164 Historic Decatur Road, Villa Nineteen, San Diego, CA 92106 USA, Telephone: +1 619 221 9200, Fax: +1 619 221 8201 Email: cbetzner@servicenetwork.org copyright 1999 - 2006 website design and hosting by The Newland Group

About Association

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PUBLIC COMMENT OF INDEPENDENT SERVICE NETWORK INTERNATIONAL PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. §16(b),(d)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PUBLIC COMMENT OF
INDEPENDENT SERVICE NETWORK INTERNATIONAL
PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. §16(b),(d)